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In this paper we make use of the European Social Survey Round 8 (European Social 188 Survey, 2016) to examine how individual-level demographic and socio-political factors are 189 linked to climate change perceptions. In particular, we will examine levels of climate change 190 perceptions and their determinants in 22 European countries and Israel. The focus of the paper 191 is on four dimensions of climate change perceptions: public beliefs about the existence, causes, 192 and consequences of climate change, and climate change concern. We distinguish between 193
climate change beliefs, defined as propositional cognitions about the nature of climate change 194 that may or may not correspond with reality (i.e. beliefs regarding the reality, causes, and 195 impacts of climate change, which are often used to identify trend, attribution, and impact 196 sceptical views; Poortinga et al., 2011) , and climate concern, defined as affective evaluations 197 of the seriousness of (the impacts of) climate change, indicated by personal feelings of worry 198 about the issue (cf. Lo & Chow, 2015) . We collectively refer to climate change beliefs and 199 concern as climate change perceptions. 200 The paper has four aims. First, it will examine national differences in climate change 201 perceptions across the 23 countries. Second, it will explore associations of different individual-202 level socio-political and demographic predictors with climate change perceptions across all 203 countries. Third, it will assess cross-national differences in the strength of the relationships 204 between these individual-level predictors and climate change perceptions, that is, whether the 205 sizes of the regression coefficients of individual-level socio-political and demographic 206 predictors differ between countries. Fourth, the paper will explore whether there are systematic 207 differences in individual-level effects between different European regions, namely Western, 208 Central and Eastern, Southern, and Northern European countries. By using high-quality, 209 standardised measures of the key variables of interest, and coordinated data collection 210 according to the highest methodological standards, the study is able to exclude methodological 211 sources of variation. 212
Methods
213
The European Social Survey 214
The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial pan-European survey that has been 215 conducted since 2002. Each round contains two modules on key social themes. Round 8 of the 216 ESS (European Social Survey, 2016 ) included a module on Climate and Energy, designed by 217 the authors together with ESS headquarters and national coordinating teams. The ESS has a 218 8 number of methodological standards regarding questionnaire design, translation and data 219 collection. The questionnaire was developed in English through a two-year design process, 220 which included extensive testing, piloting and translation by national teams (European Social 221 Survey, 2015; Fitzgerald, 2015) . Each country needed to achieve a minimum effective sample 222 size of 1,500 (or 800 in countries with populations smaller than 2 million), representative of 223 the resident population. Data collection involved strict random probability sampling to obtain 224 nationally-representative samples, and an extensive concept-based design process to ensure 225 measurement equivalence . Interviews were conducted face-to-face 226 in respondents' own homes with people aged 15 years and over. The sample sizes for the 23 227 countries are provided in Table 1 . In total, 44,387 participants were available for the analyses. 228
Data were collected, usually within three-month, in the period from August 2016 to December 229 2017. Post-stratification weight were used to take account of unequal probabilities of selection, 230 as well as of sampling and non-response error. The full questionnaire and the complete 231
European Social Survey Round 8 dataset can be downloaded from 232 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 233
Measures 234
Dependent variables (climate change perceptions) 235
Climate change beliefs. Three questions were asked to assess people's beliefs regarding the 236 existence, causes, and consequences of climate change, respectively. Trend scepticism was 237 determined by asking respondents "You may have heard the idea that the world's climate is 238 changing due to increases in temperature over the past 100 years. What is your personal opinion 239 on this? Do you think the world's climate is changing?" Respondents could use the options: 240 definitely not changing, probably not changing, probably changing, and definitely changing. 241
The 4-point response scale was dichotomised to 0 (probably/definitely changing) and 1 242 (probably/definitely not changing). Attribution scepticism was assessed with the question "Do 243 you think that climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both?" The 244 responses were coded as 1 (entirely/mainly by natural processes) and 0 (entirely/mainly by 245 human activity/about equally by natural processes and human activity). The non-prompted 246 option of "I don't think climate change is happening" was coded as missing to avoid overlap 247 with trend sceptical beliefs. Perceived impacts of climate change: respondents were asked to 248 indicate how good or bad they thought the impact of climate change would be on people across 249 the world, on a scale from -5 (extremely bad) and +5 (extremely good).
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Climate concern was assessed by asking respondents "How worried are you about climate 251 change?" with the response options of 1 (not at all worried), 2 (not very worried), 3 are reported. Hence, these models were used to estimate the overall associations of the 296 independent variables with the four climate change perception dimensions across the 23 297 countries, while allowing the countries to vary with respect to their average level on the 298 dependent variable in the respective regression model. Second, a series of random intercept, 299 random slope models were constructed for the four dependent climate change belief and 300 concern variables. This means that Model 1 was extended by allowing the slopes of the 301 independent variables to vary across countries (Model 2). Separate regression analyses were 302 conducted for each of the six independent variables in their associations with the four climate 303 change perception dimensions. That is, all independent variables were included, but only one 304 slope was allowed to vary in each regression model. This approach was chosen, as the number 305 of countries involved is insufficient to reliably estimate all parameters simultaneously. Only 306 the random effects of the multilevel regression analyses are reported. The random effects 307 indicate the cross-country variation in the strength of the association between the individual-308 level socio-political and demographic variables on the one hand and the climate change belief 309 and concern variables on the other. Third, a series of analyses was conducted to examine 310 whether there are any systematic differences between countries from different European 311
regions. This was done by adding the regions as dummy variables (Model 3a), and 312 subsequently their interactions with the socio-political and demographic variables (Model 3b 
Results
323
National differences in climate change perceptions 324
In line with several other studies (e.g. Capstick et al., 2015), we find that levels of trend 325 and attribution scepticism are low in most countries (see Table 1 ). This means that an 326 overwhelming majority of the European population thinks that climate change is happening 327 and is at least partly caused by human activity. However, there are substantial differences across 328 the participating countries. Trend scepticism ranged from 2.3% in Iceland to 16.5% in the 329
Russian Federation, and attribution scepticism from 4.0% in Spain to 15.4% in Lithuania. 330
Attribution scepticism in Norway (12.0%) was surprisingly high, given that it has a middle-331 sized level of trend scepticism (7.1%) and a just-above average level of concern about climate 332 change (see below). On average, the perceived impacts of climate change were seen to be 333 negative in all participating countries, and ranged from -1.07 in Israel to -2.55 in Portugal, 334
suggesting that most people think that the impacts of climate change around Europe (and Israel) 335 will only be slightly negative. Average levels of concern ranged from 2.64 in Israel and 2.65 336 in Estonia to 3.42 in Spain and 3.48 in Portugal. This means that in all countries concern 337 hovered around the scale midpoint of 3, which equates to "somewhat worried". These differing 338 results show the importance of distinguishing between different types of climate change beliefs 339 and concern. 340
Individual-level effects of climate change perceptions 341
We subsequently explored the associations of the individual-level socio-political and 342 demographic factors with the four climate change perception dimensions across the 23 343 countries. This was done with a series of random intercept multilevel models, in which the 344 individual-level factors were included as independent variables (Model 1). The models 345 assumed the regression coefficients to be constant but allowed the intercepts to vary across the 346 participating countries. This type of analysis allows us to explore the overall associations, while12 taking into consideration that the countries differ with respect to their means. As can be seen 348
in Table 2 , the six socio-political and demographic variables were significant predictors of a 349 number or all climate perception dimensions. Individuals who prioritise self-transcendence 350 over self-enhancing values were less likely to have trend or attribution sceptical views (as is 351 indicated by odds ratios below 1), perceived the impacts of climate change to be more negative, 352
and had higher levels of concern. The conservation vs openness-to-change value dimension 353 was non-significantly associated with trend and attribution scepticism, but individuals 354 prioritising conservation over openness-to-change values tended to perceive the impacts of 355 climate change as slightly less negative and to have slightly lower levels of concern. Individuals 356 who placed themselves on the right hand side of the political spectrum were more likely to 357 have trend or attribution sceptical views, perceived the impacts of climate change to be less 358 negative, and had lower levels of concern. 359
The results demonstrate that men were more likely to have trend and attribution 360 sceptical beliefs across the 23 countries, and generally had lower levels of concern about 361 climate change than women. In contrast to these findings, men perceived the impacts of climate 362 change to be more negative than women did. Furthermore, older respondents were more likely 363 to have trend or attribution sceptical views, perceived the impacts of climate change to be less 364 negative, and had lower levels of concern about climate change than younger respondents. 365
Finally, the results show that level of education was negatively associated with trend and 366 attribution sceptical beliefs. Respondents with higher levels of education also perceived the 367 impacts of climate change to be more negative, and had higher levels of concern about climate 368 change. 369
Cross-national differences in the strength of effects 370
In order to investigate cross-national variation in the strength of individual-level effects, 371
we conducted a series of random intercept, random slope multilevel regression analyses, in 372 which not only the intercepts but also slopes of the regression coefficients were allowed to vary 373 across countries (Model 2). Table 3 presents the cross-country variation (σ²) in the strength of 374 the associations between the individual-level socio-political and demographic variables on the 375 one hand and the climate change perception dimensions on the other. It shows that the cross-376 country variation in the associations of the self-transcendence vs self-enhancement value 377 dimension with trend scepticism, attribution scepticism and the perceived impacts of climate 378 change were significant, but not with concern about climate change. All of the associations of 379 the conservation vs. openness-to-change value dimension varied significantly across the 23 380 13 countries. For political orientation, the cross-country variation in the associations with 381 attribution scepticism, perceived impacts of climate change and concern about climate change 382 were significant, but not the one with trend scepticism. The associations of gender with 383 attribution scepticism concern about climate change varied significantly across the 23 384 countries, as did the association of gender with concern about climate change. The associations 385 of age with trend scepticism, attribution scepticism and the perceived impacts of climate 386 change were significant, but not the one with concern about climate change. Similarly, the 387 associations of education with trend scepticism, attribution scepticism and the perceived 388 impacts of climate change were significant, but not the one with concern about climate change. 389 associated with concern about climate change. It is also consistently associated with the 399 perceived negative impacts of climate change, with only a few exceptions. While the self-400 transcendence vs. self-enhancement value dimension was generally negatively associated with 401 trend and attribution scepticism, the associations were non-significant in twelve and five 402 countries, respectively (Table A) . 403
With regard to the conservation vs. openness-to-change value dimension, this factor 404 was non-significantly associated with trend and attribution scepticism in the overwhelming 405 majority of countries (Table B) . It was only significantly associated with trend scepticism in 406 the Czech Republic and with attribution scepticism in Israel. However, while the overall 407 association of the factor with the perceived impacts of climate change was non-significant 408 (Table 2) , there were a number of countries in which the association was significantly negative 409 and a number of countries where the association was significantly positive. Furthermore, 410
whereas the overall association of the conservation vs. openness-to-change value dimension 411 with concern about climate change was found to be significantly negative, the associations 412 were non-significant in a majority of the individual countries, with only a few exceptions. 413
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The associations of political orientation with the four climate perception dimensions 414 were consistent across the 23 countries (Table C) . Individuals with a right-leaning political 415 orientation were less likely to perceive negative impacts and to be concerned about climate 416 change in a majority of countries. While a right-leaning political orientation was generally 417 positively associated with trend and attribution scepticism, the associations were non-418 significant in seven and nine countries, respectively. 419
The association of gender with trend scepticism was generally consistent across the 23 420 countries ( Table D) . The association was non-significant in five countries. The associations of 421 gender with the other three climate perception dimensions were less consistent. While gender 422 was positively associated with attribution scepticism overall (Table 2), the association was non-423 significant in ten out of the 23 countries. Similarly, while gender was negatively associated 424 with concern about climate change overall, the association was non-significant in twelve out 425 of the 23 countries. While men were found to perceive less negative impacts overall, the 426 associations of gender with the perceived impacts of climate change were non-significant in all 427 but two countries. 428
Age was consistently associated with attribution scepticism: in virtually all countries 429 older respondents were more likely to have doubts about the anthropogenic nature of climate 430 change (Table E) . However, its association with the other three climate perceptions dimensions 431 was more variable. In a majority of countries, older respondents were more likely to hold trend 432 sceptical views, to perceive less negative impacts, and to be less concerned about climate 433 change; but the associations were non-significant in ten countries for each of the three 434 dimensions. The association between age and concern was even significantly positive in 435
Lithuania. 436
Respondents with a higher level of education were generally less likely to hold trend 437 and attribution sceptical beliefs, perceived more negative impacts, and were more concerned 438 about climate change (Table F) . These effects were consistent, in particular for attribution 439 scepticism and concern about climate change. The associations were non-significant in four 440 and three countries respectively. The results for trend scepticism and the perceived impacts of 441 climate change were somewhat more variable. The associations were non-significant in nine 442 and eight countries, respectively. 443 15
Differences in the strength of effects between European regions 444
We subsequently conducted a series of analyses to examine whether there are any 445 systematic differences between countries in different European regions. Table 4 ), which reflect their association with 457 the respective climate perception dimensions in Western European countries. That is, where 458 the overall regression coefficient is positive, a negative interaction term generally indicates a 459 weaker effect and a positive interaction term a stronger effect for that factor in the region of 460 interest. Reversely, where the overall regression coefficient is negative, a negative interaction 461 term generally indicates a stronger effect and a positive interaction term a weaker effect. Where 462 the overall regression coefficient is close to zero (e.g. for conservation vs openness-to-change), 463 a negative interaction term may indicate a negative effect and a positive interaction term a 464 positive effect for that factor in the region of interest. 465 Western European countries.The other interaction effects for gender were non-significant. 502
Age effects were generally weaker in Eastern European countries than in Western 503
European countries, as indicated by negative interaction terms for trend scepticism, attribution 504 scepticism and perceived impacts of climate change, and a positive interaction term for concern 505 about climate change. Age effects for the perceived impacts and concern about climate change 506 were generally stronger in Northern European countries, as indicated by a positive and a 507 negative interaction term, respectively. The only significant interaction for Southern Europe 508 was found for the perceived impacts of climate change, indicating that, on average, the age 509 effects for the perceived impacts of climate change were weaker in Southern were significantly associated with climate change perceptions in some but non-significantly so 538 in other countries; and whereas the conservation vs openness-to-change values dimension was 539 18 non-significantly associated with the four climate perception dimensions in most countries, 540 there were a number of countries in which the association was significantly negative and a 541 number of countries in which the association was significantly positive. Another interesting 542 case is the association of gender with the perceived impacts of climate change. While the 543 association is significant overall, it is only so in a small minority of individual countries 544 (associations are non-significant in the other countries). 545
Even if the direction of the associations were to a large extent consistent, the sizes of 546 the effects were not. This shows the importance of cross-cultural research, and the need to 547 validate results in multiple countries and cultural contexts before assuming certain effects are 548 universal. For example, while climate change perceptions are fairly consistently linked to 549 political orientation, they are not equally polarised in every country. This not only applies to 550 the socio-political factors but also to the demographic ones. Evidence was found that the effects 551 for the demographic (e.g. age) and socio-political (e.g. political orientation) factors are 552 generally weaker in Eastern as compared to Western European countries. Some of the 553 demographic effects (e.g. gender and age) appeared stronger in Northern European countries. It is less clear as to why some of the demographic and value effects vary across 593 countries and regions; and there is no coherent literature available to draw upon. Gender 594 differences in environmental risk perception are often explained by social inequalities, and it 595 could be argued that such effects are therefore less likely to emerge in more gender equal 596 societies (Norgaard & York, 2005 ). This view is however not supported by the results of the 597 current study. Gender effects appeared stronger in Northern European countries that tend to 598 have higher levels of gender equality. Further research is needed to see wat may explain the 599 effects. 600
There is a need to be cautious when interpreting the reported findings. The study 601 involved a relatively small number of countries (n=23). This means that the models only have 602 the statistical power to detect large national-level differences (Button et al., 2013) . One 603 criticism of current climate perception research is that the vast majority of empirical focus has 604 20 been on a small number of mainly affluent Western countries (Hopkins, 2015) . A strength of 605 our study is that there was a range of countries, including a number of 
